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Abstract: 
 
The expression of gratitude by children and young adolescents in different societies is the topic 
of this special issue. We introduce the concept of gratitude as a virtue, explaining its differences 
from gratitude viewed as a positive emotion. Although most research on gratitude uses samples 
from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies (primarily 
from the United States), we discuss the importance of studying the development of gratitude 
across different cultural groups. Despite the evidence to suggest that the expression of gratitude 
is viewed as desirable across multiple societies and historical periods, there is no reason to 
assume that developmental pathways found in one or other WEIRD society would be found in 
non-WEIRD societies or that the latter would have similar pathways. Children’s gratitude 
expression across countries is explored in this special issue using Baumgarten-Tramer’s (1938) 
paradigm as well as Kağıtçıbaşı’s (2007) framework to address both differences and similarities 
across cultures. 
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Article: 
 
The articles in this special issue are devoted to the development of gratitude in different cultural 
contexts. There has been a growing interest in gratitude, particularly since the start of this 
century (Tudge & Freitas, 2018), but it has been conceptualized and studied in different ways 
(Gulliford, Morgan, & Kristjánsson, 2013). Gratitude has been mostly studied as a positive 
emotion linked to a tendency to respond with grateful emotion to experiences (McCullough, 
Emmons, & Tsang, 2002; McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001). From this 
perspective, there is no need of reciprocation toward a benefactor, as what counts is the feeling 
triggered by receiving a benefit or experiencing a positive event. 
 
However, there are problems with this conceptualization of gratitude. One can imagine an 
individual who feels a positive emotion toward a benefactor but who fails to do anything for that 
benefactor when he or she subsequently needs help. If such behavior typically occurred, it might 
be more reasonable to term this individual ungrateful, no matter the degree of positive emotion 
felt. In other words, gratitude must be more than simply a positive emotion toward something 
gained or for an experience (Morgan, Gulliford, & Kristjánsson, 2017). 
 
In this special issue, we treat gratitude as a moral virtue; as such, it involves one person (the 
beneficiary) (a) receiving a freely given benefit (a gift, favor, help, etc.) from another (the 
benefactor), (b) feeling positive about what the benefactor intentionally did, and (c) freely 
wishing to reciprocate with something of benefit to the benefactor. Various social, cognitive, and 
moral processes are involved here, such as the ability to consider others’ points of view and to 
autonomously wish to reciprocate (McConnell, 1993; McCullough, Kimeldorf, & Cohen, 
2008; Tudge, Freitas, & O’Brien, 2015). 
 
The first two points listed as part of the definition are widely accepted in the literature, 
particularly by those scholars who write about gratitude as a targeted, discriminate, 
prepositional, or triadic concept (see, for example, Carr & Harrison, 2018; Gulliford et al., 
2013; McConnell, 2016). Whichever of these terms is used, scholars using them view gratitude 
as having to do with the relation between a beneficiary and an intentional benefactor. There are, 
however, some clearly divergent positions; some authors argue that an intentional benefactor is 
not a necessary condition for gratitude to be felt and expressed, and others disagree that gratitude 
entails reciprocity, the third point of the definition we use. 
 
Regarding the first position, some authors have suggested that an intentional benefactor is not 
required—one can feel gratitude to inanimate objects or to events (e.g., Boleyn-Fitzgerald, 
2016; McAleer, 2012); in this sense, gratitude may be termed non-targeted, indiscriminate, 
propositional, or dyadic. However, as Roberts (2016) noted, “to the extent that the construct 
really posits no benefactor, it just amounts to gladness about the benefit” (p. 68). Similarly, 
McConnell argued that “at its core, gratitude is a discriminate notion; we are grateful to someone 
for something” (2016, p. 23) and Fagley’s (2016) thesis is that much of what is viewed as 
nontargeted, or indiscriminate, gratitude would be better termed “appreciation.” We agree with 
the latter three positions; to say that one is grateful for the fact that it has stopped raining is no 
different from saying that one is glad, happy, or appreciative for the cessation of rain. The 
term gratitude should, we believe, be more tightly defined. 
 
The second argument relates to the issue of reciprocity, and our position (expressed as the third 
point in the definition provided above) is in the minority. Much of the argument rests on the view 
that duty, obligation, or debt are the marks of a business transaction. Or, as Card (1988) stated, 
“The idea of a debt of gratitude seems paradoxical. If that for which gratitude is due was neither 
for sale nor a mere loan but was in some sense gratis, what sense does it make to feel indebted 
for it” (p. 115)? And if one has a debt of gratitude, paying that debt “from duty seems to betray 
an absence of gratitude” (p. 117). Similarly, Wellman (1999) argued that failure to reciprocate, 
given a good opportunity to do so, is a moral failing, but not one that has implications for 
gratitude for “there are no duties of gratitude” (p. 284). From a neo-Aristotelian virtue-ethics 
perspective, however, it is impossible for an individual to have simultaneously the moral virtue 
of gratitude and the moral failing that looks a good deal like ingratitude (Annas, 2011; Hughes, 
2013). 
 
The problem is caused by the confusion between duties, debts, and obligations that one has to 
accept (in the sense of some type of contract) and which, when paid, are fully discharged, and the 
duties, debts, and obligations that one takes on freely. As Card (1988) noted, “Contractual bonds 
are not the only ethically significant interpersonal ties” (p. 120), and she wrote about the 
difference between formal (contractual) and informal ties of obligation, such as those of 
friendship. Similarly, Roberts (2016) drew a parallel between gratitude and love: “You feel a 
kind of happy ‘pressure’ to acknowledge lovingly the other’s love . . . This is the only sense in 
which you want to pay the debt” (p. 61). In other words, it is an obligation created and fostered 
in the relationship itself. Such a debt of gratitude is not paid off when reciprocating—it is not the 
completion of a contract—and it is felt and paid willingly. 
 
Another way of thinking about this is to distinguish between a heteronomous (externally 
provided) and an autonomous (internal) sense of obligation (see Mendonça & Palhares, 2018). 
Contracts are externally controlled; if one feels a heteronomous obligation to repay a benefit with 
something as a way of “paying off the debt” in a “tit for tat” way, this is not evidence of 
gratitude as a virtue. The latter requires that one freely and willingly accepts the moral obligation 
to reciprocate in an appropriate way, should an opportunity present itself. This is what grateful 
individuals do. 
 
Ingratitude, by contrast, is viewed as the “king of the vices” (Emmons, 2016), because there is 
the expectation that when benefactors have, freely and intentionally, provided a beneficiary with 
a significant benefit, that beneficiary will try to reciprocate if at all possible, and would be 
considered morally suspect if never doing so. Simply feeling a positive emotional response to a 
benefactor is not enough. Therefore, in our view (see Tudge & Freitas, 2018; Tudge, Freitas, & 
O’Brien, 2015), the issue of reciprocity cannot be left out of the definition of gratitude as a 
virtue. 
 
Reciprocity is not, of course, a sufficient marker of gratitude. One can reciprocate merely to pay 
off a debt to a benefactor, one can reciprocate in the appropriate manner but only on rare 
occasions, or reciprocate only because one is forced to do so (by a parent, perhaps). In none of 
these cases would one be considered to be virtuously grateful. Gratitude can be considered a 
virtue when it is an enduring feature and characteristic of a person; that is, for a person to be 
considered grateful, it is not enough to feel and act gratefully once in a while, if these actions and 
feelings are not typically felt and done. In other words, gratitude must be practiced habitually and 
consistently, although not necessarily on each and every occasion—there are situations in which 
an apparently kind act does not warrant a grateful response (Morgan & Gulliford, 2018) or when 
there are mitigating circumstances that justify not reciprocating even when given a suitable 
opportunity (McConnell, 2013). Nonetheless, it can be considered a reliable disposition that is 
socially admirable and that shapes other peoples’ expectations regarding the way the person will 
feel and act when gratitude is an appropriate response (Annas, 2011; Tudge & Freitas, 2018). 
 
As Kristjánsson (2013) pointed out: “Truly virtuous persons do not only perform the right 
actions, but they perform them for the right reasons and from the right motives” (p. 202). Not 
surprisingly, gratitude is not innate but develops with age (Baumgarten-Tramer, 1938; Do Vale, 
2012; Freitas, Pieta, & Tudge, 2011; Nelson et al., 2013; Tudge, Freitas, & O’Brien, 2015). 
Becoming virtuous takes time and is developed through education, habituation, and life 
experiences (Annas, 2011). It is first through interactions with adults and later with peers that 
children learn normative values that regulate their relationships with others, which contributes to 
the development of moral values, including gratitude (Prestes, Castro, Tudge, & Freitas, 2014). 
 
These moral values are likely to vary across different sociocultural groups (Prinz, 2009), and one 
of the foremost goals of moral education is to help establishing moral schemas in children and 
adolescents by encouraging them to act in accordance with their society’s moral values 
(Kristjánsson, 2015). According to La Taille (2000), the moral values embodied in gratitude are 
positively regarded by most people and cultures, and are viewed as a standard of a desirable 
character. But is gratitude therefore experienced and expressed similarly across cultural groups? 
There is reason to think that this is not the case. 
 
The Problem of Implicit Generalization 
 
Most research on gratitude in general, and on the development of gratitude in particular, have 
used samples from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies 
(WEIRD; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia (Arnett, 2008; Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 2017; Tomlinson & Swartz, 
2003; Tudge & Freitas, 2012). Results from these studies have typically assumed an implicit 
generalization—scholars usually talk about “children” and “adolescents” without specifying the 
cultural groups from which the children are drawn, such as North American children drawn from 
a primarily middle-class and European American population (Arnett, 2008). It is also worth 
noting that it is common for scholars in some societies to treat results from studies conducted in 
the United States as relevant to their own country, despite the absence of research on the same 
topic conducted in their own context (Tudge & Freitas, 2012). 
 
Attention has thus been drawn to the importance of considering cultural influences on human 
development. For example, a cross-cultural approach to understanding child development 
provides more variation than can be found in studies that sample from a single homogeneous 
group (e.g., middle-class European American children) or even from a diverse sample that is 
drawn from a single society. That is, only if cultural diversity is addressed is it possible to make 
sense of what is otherwise considered typical and atypical development. This has several 
implications both for studies implicitly assuming universality and for theories claiming 
universality (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2007). 
 
In addition, one of the greatest contributions of cross-cultural research is the opportunity to 
promote greater cultural sensitivity in academic knowledge. Approaching research from a 
culturally sensitive perspective likely encourages researchers to behave more ethically and 
responsibly. Such a perspective requires researchers to recognize the value in different 
experiences and ways of living, which, in turn, may decrease the often implicit idea that 
dominant values are normative (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2007; Orbuch & Fine, 2003). 
 
These considerations are critical for the study of any developmental process, including how 
children develop gratitude. It is certainly not reasonable for anyone to assume that developmental 
pathways to gratitude found in the United States will be found elsewhere, as it is also 
questionable to think that non-WEIRD cultures will all present similar patterns of gratitude 
expression. The various articles included in this special issue will provide some evidence for the 
variability in expression of gratitude that exists in different parts of the world. 
 
Conceptualizing gratitude as a moral virtue, Baumgarten-Tramer (1938) and other scholars using 
her approach (Freitas et al., 2011; Merçon-Vargas, Pieta, Freitas, & Tudge, 2016; Pieta, 
2009; Tudge, Freitas, Mokrova, et al., 2015; Wang, Wang, & Tudge, 2015) have demonstrated 
the existence of different types of gratitude, varying in degree of proximity to a virtue (as 
defined), across different ages. These types of gratitude indicate an increasing presence of some 
elements of gratitude as a moral virtue, such as recognition of a benefactor’s intentionality, an 
autonomous wish to repay, and the consideration of others’ needs or desires, in contrast to 
heteronomous reciprocity and/or simple politeness. 
 
One of the advantages of addressing gratitude as a moral virtue is that it focuses on the relation 
between benefactor and beneficiary (it is, therefore, interpersonal), and not only on the 
beneficiary’s feelings elicited by the received benefit. Furthermore, the perspective of gratitude 
as a moral virtue is valuable for the study of the development of gratitude across different 
cultures. The understanding of how gratitude develops may allow us to better comprehend how 
morality is developed, how characters are shaped, and in which ways cognitive and moral 
processes and values are implicated in development (La Taille, 2000, 2018). 
 
How Does Gratitude Develop? 
 
It is not easy trying to disentangle the development of gratitude and other related factors, such as 
the development of cognitive abilities and environmental conditions that may foster gratitude 
(e.g., cultural values). From a cognitive developmental perspective, Piaget’s (1932/1965, 
1965/1995) notion of morality includes a gradual development from a heteronomous moral 
orientation (obedience and unilateral relations) to an autonomous moral sense (mutuality and 
cooperation). This development involves a decentration of the self, increasingly enabling 
individuals to coordinate different points of view and to engage in more reciprocal relationships. 
 
Whereas heteronomous morality is objective and one of simple duty, autonomous morality is 
based on mutual respect and reciprocity. However, the development from heteronomous to 
autonomous morality is by no means straightforward. Thanks to cooperation among peers, young 
children may develop the sense of autonomous morality, but it coexists with the heteronomous 
morality learned in dealings with parents and other authority figures (Piaget, 1932/1965). Over 
time, one or other type of morality will come to predominate, and Piaget considered that human 
beings, to become fully developed, would become autonomously moral (Freitas, 2003). This 
developmental process may be considered as essential for the development of gratitude. In line 
with that, Nelson and colleagues (2013) found that better understanding of emotions and of 
others’ mental states at age 3 served as precursors to some understanding of gratitude at age 5. 
 
Gratitude, thus, involves cognitively complex abilities and degrees of moral understanding that 
develop throughout childhood and adolescence (Do Vale, 2012; Freitas, O’Brien, Nelson, & 
Marcovitch, 2012; Nelson et al., 2013). Time, experience, and encouragement are needed for 
gratitude to fully develop, with less complex forms of gratitude being present during this process 
of development (Baumgarten & Tramer, 1938; Freitas et al., 2011; Tudge, Freitas, Mokrova, et 
al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015). 
 
Baumgarten-Tramer’s (1938) study in Switzerland was the first study addressing different types 
of gratitude across the ages of 7 to 15. She asked children and adolescents, “What is your 
greatest wish?” and “What would you do for the person who granted you this wish?” She then 
derived different types of gratitude expression from the participants’ responses: (a) verbal 
gratitude, (b) concrete gratitude, reflected in the wish to reciprocate with things important to 
oneself rather than to the benefactor (which was more typical among younger children), and (c) a 
more sophisticated type of gratitude (connective) that showed an ability to take the benefactor’s 
wishes or needs into account (which was more typical among adolescents). A fourth type of 
gratitude, finalistic (e.g., being an excellent student in return for a scholarship to a good 
university), was rarely found and only among 14- and 15-year-olds. 
 
This approach is useful to understand the development of gratitude because a desired benefit that 
is meaningful to the participants is set with the first question (“what is your greatest wish?”). 
Moreover, the second question allows researchers to assess different ways in which children say 
they would reciprocate their hypothetical benefactor without imposing any type of answer. With 
that, it is possible to infer whether children express reciprocation autonomously (taking the 
benefactor’s needs or wishes into account, such as “I would do anything she needed”), or 
indicating a simple need of reciprocity (not considering the other’s perspective, such as “I would 
give him a cookie”), or still only verbally (such as “I would say ‘thank you’”). 
 
We can think of the less complex forms of gratitude (concrete and verbal) as possibly a self-
centered way of reciprocation, indicating no evidence of considering what might be desired by or 
useful to the benefactor. Verbal gratitude may involve an understanding of intentionality and/or 
an appreciation of the benefactor’s wishes and needs (but without the explicit desire to 
reciprocate), or could simply involve politeness. Saying “thank you” is something often 
encouraged by parents even in very young children (Freitas et al., 2011; Visser, 2009). 
Reciprocity can exist without morality, but morality does not exist without reciprocity; thus, a 
sense of reciprocity would be necessary for, but not equivalent to, gratitude (Bonnie & de Waal, 
2004). This approach is different from seeing gratitude as a positive emotion, given that the aim 
is not to assess the child’s feeling when the benefit is (hypothetically) received, but what she or 
he would do in response to gaining such a benefit. 
 
Some scholars have addressed the development of gratitude in other countries using 
Baumgarten-Tramer’s (1938) approach. These studies suggested that even though age-related 
changes had similar trends for children in different countries (i.e., Freitas et al., 2011; Merçon-
Vargas et al., 2016; Pieta, 2009; Tudge, Freitas, Mokrova, et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015), some 
important cultural differences in gratitude expression seem to exist. Consequently, more studies 
should focus on clarifying the developmental and cultural aspects of gratitude. 
 
Does Gratitude Differ Across Cultural Contexts? 
 
Although gratitude as a virtue may be found and valued in most—if not all—cultures, the extent 
to which it is valued, considered appropriate to express, and the ways in which it is expressed 
may differ according to societies’ cultural values (Prinz, 2009; Tiberius, 2004; Tudge, Freitas, & 
O’Brien, 2015). Overall, gratitude has been examined with limited attention paid to the influence 
of context (cultural or not), although some studies have shown how different cultures encourage 
behaviors that may have moral significance, such as helping behaviors (Levine, Norenzayan, & 
Philbrick, 2001) and politeness (Farashaiyan & Hua, 2012; Naito, Wangwan, & Tani, 2005). 
 
One of the most common frameworks to study cultural differences involves the use of a 
unidimensional scale bounded by individualism and collectivism (Hofstede, 1980/2001; 
Triandis, 1989, 1993, 2001). However, several scholars have suggested moving beyond this 
simplistic view (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2007; Keller, 2007; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; 
Strauss, 2000; Tamis-LeMonda et al., 2008). For instance, these authors have shown that both 
within the United States and other societies there can be found a good deal of support for both 
individualistic and collectivistic values, suggesting that more attention be paid to within-culture 
variation (particularly related to socioeconomic but also ethnic, regional, political, or religious 
factors). 
 
Kağıtçıbaşı’s (2007) orthogonal view of cultural differences may be more helpful to understand 
in which ways cultural values influence the expression of gratitude as a moral virtue across 
cultural groups. Kağıtçıbaşı suggested that individualism comprises both an agentic component 
(autonomy) and a lack of strong ties to others outside the immediate family (separateness). She 
also argued that the concept of collectivism confounds strong ties with the group (relatedness) 
and being subject to elders’ rules (heteronomy). 
 
Based on that, Kağıtçıbaşı (2007) proposed two different dimensions of cultural variation: 
agency (autonomy–heteronomy) and interpersonal distance (related–separate). According to her, 
parents in countries like the United States and those in Western Europe would mostly value 
autonomy-separateness. Traditional cultural groups in the “Majority World” (developing 
societies, where the majority of the world’s children live) would mostly value heteronomy-
relatedness, and urbanized and educated groups in Majority World societies would mostly value 
autonomy-relatedness. From this theoretical perspective, then, values such as autonomy and 
relatedness are not opposites and can coexist. 
 
Although Kağıtçıbaşı (2007) proposed these as prototypical values for societies, her perspective 
allows for more cultural variation, given that it considers two cultural dimensions that, in varying 
degrees, shape the self in particular ways. This can be seen, for example, in socioeconomic-
related variations in values in Brazil (e.g., Seidl-de-Moura, Carvalho, & Vieira, 2013; Seidl-de-
Moura et al., 2008; Seidl-de-Moura, Mendes, et al., 2013; Tudge, Martins, et al., 2018; Vieira et 
al., 2010) and ethnic groups in the United States (e.g., Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2001; Suizzo, 
2007). In general, Kağıtçıbaşı suggested that her approach can be used to illustrate the fact that 
there are different types of selves in relation to agency and interpersonal distance, which will 
then affect different aspects of psychological functioning, including morality. 
 
Thus, the cultural values (or combination of values) proposed by Kağıtçıbaşı (2007) may serve 
as a cultural framework to understand gratitude as a virtue. It is possible that contexts that 
encourage children to think and act in a more self-directed way (autonomously), as well as 
stimulate them to think and act considering the social group (relatedness), will then foster 
children and adolescents who express gratitude considering others’ points of view and wish to 
reciprocate autonomously, whenever possible (and not because they were told to). 
 
There is some indirect support for the position that children in countries considered to vary in the 
agency and interpersonal-distance cultural dimensions express different types of gratitude. For 
instance, Wang and colleagues (2015) found that children aged 7 to 14 in the United States were 
4.2 times less likely to express connective gratitude than were same-aged Chinese children. 
Different ways in which the expression of gratitude changes across age-groups were also found 
in these societies—whereas older North American children (aged 11 to 14) were more likely to 
express verbal gratitude and less likely to express concrete gratitude than were their younger 
counterparts (aged 7 to 10), in the Chinese sample verbal gratitude decreased with age and 
concrete gratitude stayed relatively stable (but at lower rates than in the United States). 
 
In the following articles in this special issue, we will address the extent to which children in 
societies that are assumed to differ on Kağıtçıbaşı’s (2007) cultural dimensions do, indeed, 
express gratitude differently or similarly from each other. Thus, using Kağıtçıbaşı’s theory as a 
basis for the hypotheses, we expect that societies more likely to value autonomy-relatedness will 
have a greater proportion of children expressing connective gratitude (considering the 
benefactor’s perspective). In contrast, children in societies deemed more likely to value 
autonomy-separateness will have a greater proportion of children expressing concrete gratitude. 
It is also important to note that even societies considered to be more likely to value autonomy-
relatedness may differ in their expression of gratitude, as these are not fixed and homogeneous 
categories, but may vary in degrees. It is important, therefore, to move beyond lumping groups 
into two broad groups represented by contrasting poles. We, therefore, consider it crucial to 
include diverse societies from varied parts of the world to explore cultural variations in 
children’s expression of gratitude. 
 
This special issue includes a total of 10 papers, with the following paper (Tudge, Freitas, 
O’Brien, & Mokrova, 2018) addressing the methods of collecting the data and the basic analytic 
strategies employed. Using the methodology described in this second article, the seven 
subsequent articles will address children’s expression of gratitude in Brazil, Guatemala, the 
United States, China, South Korea, Russia, and Turkey. The authors of each article will 
acknowledge the particularities of each context and provide culturally appropriate information 
about each society. The final article in this issue will summarize the results discussed in previous 
articles, addressing cross-cultural similarities and differences, and discussing the meaning of the 
findings to the study of the development of gratitude. 
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